Abstract. Social norms are the building blocks of social institutions, but the mechanisms that induce norm shifts are complex and not well understood. Changes in norms are typically caused by one of three mechanisms: they can be triggered by idiosyncratic changes in individual perceptions and expectations, by changes in general external conditions (such as prices or technology), and by deliberate experimentation with novel ideas. While these mechanisms differ in some respects, they have similar dynamic effects: change tends to be slow and fitful at first, then accelerates rapidly once a critical threshold is crossed. Of particular importance to norm diffusion is the structure of the social network through which agents obtain information. This paper characterizes the rate at which a social innovation spreads based on three factors: the extent to which agents interact in small clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo, and the amount of noise in the best response process. The analysis shows why social innovations tend to occur in large jumps rather than through small incremental improvements.
Introduction
Social institutions are forms of capital that, together with physical and human capital, determine the rate of economic growth. Notable examples include private property rights and legal systems to protect them, accounting methods, forms of corporate governance, and the terms of economic contracts. Yet, in contrast with the literature on technological progress, relatively little is known about the ways in which new institutions are created and how they become established within a given social framework. In this paper I discuss one approach to this problem using methods from evolutionary game theory.
In the abstract, an institution can be viewed as a set of rules that structure a given type of interaction between individuals [1] . These rules can be simple coordination devices, such as which hand to extend in greeting or who goes through the door first. Or they can be very elaborate, such as rituals of courtship and marriage, cycles of retribution, performance criteria in employment contracts, or litigation procedures in the courts. We would like to know how a particular set of rules becomes established as common practice, and what process describes the displacement of one set of rules by another.
The viewpoint we shall adopt here is that new norms and institutions are introduced through a process of invention or discovery, which is followed by a period in which various people try to coordinate using the new rules. Under certain conditions that we shall discuss below, this trial-and-error process will eventually trigger a general change in expectations and behaviors that establishes the new institution within society at large. However, it can take a very long time for this to happen even when the new way of doing things is superior to the status quo.
One reason for this inertia is lack of information: it may not be immediately evident that an innovation actually is superior to the status quo, due to the small number of prior instances and variability in their outcomes. Thus it may take a long time for enough information to accumulate before it becomes clear that the innovation is superior [2] . A second reason is that an innovation as initially conceived may not work very well in practice; it must be refined over time through a process of learning by doing [3] . A third reason is that innovations often exhibit increasing returns. Indeed this feature is especially important for social innovations, which by definition require coordinated change in expectations and behaviors by multiple individuals. For example, an individual who invents a new form of legal contract cannot simply institute it on his own: first, the other parties to the contract must enter into it, and second, the ability to enforce the contract will depend on its acceptance in society more generally.
Institutions exhibit strongly increasing returns precisely because of their function as coordination technologies.
This increasing returns phenomenon has important implications for the dynamics governing institutional change. Of particular relevance is the social network that governs people's interactions. The reason is that, when a social innovation first appears, it will typically gain a foothold in a relatively small subgroup of individuals that are closely linked by geography or social connections. Once the new way of doing things has become firmly established within a local social group, it propagates to the rest of society through the social network. Thus a key determinant of the speed with which institutional change occurs is the network topology, and in particular the extent to which interactions are 'localized.'
The relationship between speed of diffusion and network structure has been investigated in a variety of settings. One branch of the literature is concerned with dynamics in which each agent responds deterministically to the number of his neighbors who have adopted the innovation. From an initial seeding among a subset of agents, the question is how long it takes for the innovation to spread as a function of network structure [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . A second branch of the literature explores dynamics in which agents respond to their neighbors' choices probabilistically, that is, actions with higher expected payoffs are more likely to be chosen than actions with low expected payoffs. Here the question is how long it takes in expectation for the innovation to spread in the population at large [9] [10] [11] [12] . This hinges on topological properties of the network that are different from those that determine the speed of convergence in the nonstochastic case. Yet a third branch of the literature examines the issue of how the network structure itself evolves as agents are matched and rematched to play a given game [13] [14] [15] [16] .
In this paper we shall assume that agents adjust their behaviour probabilistically, and that the network structure is fixed. In contrast to earlier work in this vein, however, we shall emphasize that it is not only the network topology that determines how fast an innovation spreads. Rather the speed depends on the interaction between three complementary factors: i) the payoff gain represented by the innovation in relation to the status quo, ii) the responsiveness or rationality of the agents, that is, the probability that they choose a (myopic) best response given their information, and iii) the presence of small autonomous enclaves where the innovation can gain an initial foothold, combined with pathways that allow the innovation to spread by contagion once it has gained a sufficient number of distinct footholds. We also employ a somewhat subtle notion of what it means for an innovation to 'spread quickly'. Namely, we ask how long it takes in expectation for a high proportion of agents to adopt the innovation and stick with it with high probability. This latter condition is needed because, in a stochastic learning process, it is quite possible for an innovation to spread initially, but then go into reverse and perhaps even die out. This is presumably not what we have in mind when we say that an innovation spreads successfully.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First we distinguish between fast and slow rates of diffusion. Roughly speaking, an innovation spreads quickly in a given class of networks if the expected waiting time to reach a high level of penetration and stay at that level with high probability is bounded above independently of the number of agents; otherwise the innovation spreads slowly. Whether it spreads quickly or slowly depends on the particular learning rule used, the degree of rationality of the agents, the gain in payoff from the innovation, and the structure of the network. In much of the paper we shall focus on log linear learning to illustrate these points; similar results hold for other noisy learning processes. Among the key findings are the following.
1. If the agents' level of rationality is too low, the waiting time to spread successfully is very long (in fact it may be infinite) because there is too much noise in the system for a substantial proportion of the agents to stay coordinated on the innovation once it has spread initially. However, if the level of rationality is too high, it takes an exponentially long time in expectation for the innovation to gain a foothold anywhere.* Hence only for intermediate levels of rationality can one expect the waiting time to be fast in an absolute sense and to be bounded independently of the number of agents. In this respect the analysis differs substantially from that in Montanari and Saberi [12] .) 2. Certain topological characteristics of the network promote fast learning. In particular, if the agents fall into small clusters or enclaves that are mainly connected with each other as opposed to outsiders, then learning will be fast, assuming that the level of rationality is neither too low nor too high. One reason why clustering may occur in practice is homophily --the tendency of like to associate with like [6, 18] . Moreover, recent empirical work suggests that some behaviors actually do spread more quickly in clustered networks than in random ones [19] . However, not everyone has to be contained in a small cluster for learning to be fast: it suffices that the innovation be able gain a foothold in a subset of clusters from which it can spread by contagion.
3. For convergence to be fast, it is not necessary for the agents to be contained in enclaves that are small in an absolute sense; it suffices that everyone be contained in a subgroup of bounded (possibly large) size that has a sufficiently high proportion of its interactions with other members of the group as opposed to outsiders. Various natural networks have this property, including those in which agents are embedded more or less uniformly in a finite Euclidean space, and are neighbors if and only if they are within some specified distance of one another. (This follows from Proposition 2 below; a similar result is proved in [12] .) 4. The payoff gain from the innovation relative to the status quo -the size of the advance --has an important bearing on the absolute speed with which it spreads.
If the advance is sufficiently large, no special topological properties of the network are required for fast learning: it suffices that the maximum degree is bounded.
5. An innovation that leads to a small advance will tend to take exponentially longer to spread than an innovation with a large advance. This implies that successful innovations will often occur in big bursts, because a major advance may overtake prior attempts at small advances, which take too long to become established.
The model
Let  be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E, where the edges are assumed neighbors, that is, the set of all vertices j such that { , } i j is an edge. Thus the
To give this a concrete interpretation, suppose that B is a form of contractual negotiation that relies solely on a verbal understanding and a handshake, whereas A requires a written agreement and a witness to the parties' signatures.
If one side insists on a written agreement (A) while the other side views a verbal understanding as appropriate (B), they will fail to coordinate because they disagree on the basic rules of the game. Note that this meta-game (agreeing on the rules of the game) can be viewed as a pure coordination game: if the parties fail to coordinate there are no payoff gains relative to the status quo. This situation is shown below, where  is the added benefit from having a written agreement.
This is the set-up we shall use throughout the paper.
Learning
How do agents adapt their expectations and behaviors in such an environment?
Several models of the learning process have been proposed in the literature; here we shall discuss two particular examples. Assume that each agent updates at random times according to the realization of a Poisson process with unit expectation. The processes are assumed to be independent among agents. Thus the probability is zero that two agents update simultaneously, and each agent updates once per unit time period in expectation. We shall think of each update by some agent as defining a 'tick' of the clock, where the ticks are denoted by t = 1, 2, 3, ….. Each of these will be called a period.
Denote the state of the process at the start of period t by
  be a small error probability. Suppose that agent i is the unique agent who updates at time t.
Assume that, with probability 1   , i chooses an action w that maximizes
, and with probability  he chooses A or B uniformly at random. This is known as the uniform error model [20] [21] .
An alternative approach is the log linear model [10] . Given a real number 0   , assume that agent i chooses A with probability
In other words, the log probability of choosing A minus the log probability of choosing B is  times the difference in payoff; hence the term "log linear learning." (This model is also standard in the discrete choice literature [22] .)
The parameter  measures the responsiveness or rationality of the agent: the larger  is, the more likely it is that he chooses a best reply given the actions of his neighbors, i.e., the less likely it is that he experiments with a suboptimal action.
More generally, we may define a perturbed best response learning process as follows.
Let G be a 2 x 2 game with payoff matrix as in (3), and let  be a weighted undirected network with n nodes, each occupied by an agent. For simplicity we shall continue to assume that agents update asynchronously according to i.i.d.
Poisson arrival processes. Let  > 0 be a noise parameter, and let 
The speed of diffusion
Let B  be the initial state in which everyone is following the status quo behavior B. How long does it take for the innovative behavior A to become widely adopted? One criterion would be the expected waiting time until the first time that everyone plays A. Unfortunately this definition is not satisfactory due to the stochastic nature of the learning process. To understand the nature of the problem, consider a situation in which  is close to zero, so that the probability of playing A is only slightly larger than the probability of playing B. No matter how long we wait, the probability is high that a sizable proportion of the population will be playing B at any given future time.
Thus the expected waiting time until everyone first plays A is not the relevant concept. A similar difficulty arises for any stochastic learning process: if the noise is too large it is unlikely that everyone is playing A in any given period.
We are therefore led to the following definition. Given a noisy learning process P  on a graph  (not necessarily log linear learning), for each state x let ( ) a x denote the proportion of agents playing A in state x . Given a target level of
In words, ( , , , )
is the expected waiting time until at least p of the agents are playing A, and the probability is at least p that at least this proportion plays A at all subsequent times. The waiting time depends on the learning process P  (including the specific level of noise  , as well as on the graph  and the game G . Notice that the higher the value of p, the smaller the noise must be for the waiting time to be finite.
To distinguish between fast and slow learning as a function of the number of agents, we shall consider families of networks of different sizes, where the size of a network is the number of nodes (equivalently, the number of agents). , the expected waiting time until at least p of the agents play A (and continue to do so with probability at least p in each subsequent period) is bounded above independently of the number of agents n in the network.
This result differs in a key respect from those in Montanari and Saberi [12] , who
show that for log linear learning the waiting time to reach all-A with high probability is bounded as a function of n provided that the noise level is arbitrarily small. Unfortunately this implies that the absolute waiting time to reach all-A is arbitrarily large, because the waiting time until any given agent first switches to A grows exponentially as the noise level goes to zero. 
, which is a contradiction.
Autonomy and close-knittedness
The autonomy condition has a particularly natural topological interpretation 
Further, for every nonempty subset '
In other words, ( ) d S is the weighted sum of edges with at least one end in S whereas ( ', ) d S S is the weighted sum of edges with one end in ' S and the other end in S . Given any real number (0,1/ 2] r  , we say that the set S is r-close-knit if
S is r-close-knit if no subset has "too many" (i.e., more than 1 -r) interactions with outsiders. This implies in particular that no individual  i S has more than One consequence of close-knittedness is that the "perimeter" of S must not be too large relative to its "area." Specifically, let us define the perimeter and area of any nonempty set of vertices  S V as follows:
Next observe that
If S is autonomous under log linear learning, then by definition the potential function of the restricted process is maximized when everyone in S chooses A.
Straightforward computations show that this implies the following.
Proposition 2. Given a graph  and innovation advance 0   , S is autonomous for

 under log linear learning if and only if S is r-close-knit for some
1/ ( 2) r    .
Corollary 2.1. If S is autonomous for  under log linear learning, then
A family of graphs G is close-knit if for every (0,1/ 2) r  there exists a positive integer s(r) such that, for every   G, every node of  is in an r-close-knit set of cardinality at most s(r) [24] .
Corollary 2.2. Given any close-knit family of graphs G, log linear learning is fast for
all 0   .
Examples
Consider n nodes located around a circle, where each node is linked by an edge to its two immediate neighbors and the edge-weights are one. (This is the situation originally studied by Ellison [9] .) Any set of s consecutive nodes has area s -1 and perimeter 2. It follows that for any 0   , log linear learning is fast.
Next consider a two-dimensional regular lattice (a square grid) in which every vertex has degree 4 (see figure 1 ). Assume that each edge has weight 1. The shaded region in figure 1 is a subset of nine nodes that is 1/3-close-knit. Hence it is autonomous whenever 1   . 
Furthermore it is easily checked that for every nonempty subset ' A d-dimensional lattice illustrates the concept of autonomy in a very transparent way, but it applies in many other situations as well. Indeed one could argue that many real-world networks are composed of relatively small autonomous groups, either because people tend to cluster geographically, or because they tend to interact with people of their own kind (homophily), or for both reasons.
To understand the difference between a network with small autonomous groups and one without, consider the pair of networks in Figure 2 . The top panel shows a tree in which every node other than the end-nodes has degree 4, and there is a "hub" (not shown) that is connected to all the end-nodes. The bottom panel shows a graph with a similar overall structure in which every node other than the hub has degree 4; however, in this case everyone (except the hub) is contained in a clique of size 4. In both networks all edges are assumed to have weight 1.
Fig 2.
Two networks of degree 4, except for a hub (not shown) that is connected to every end-node (dashed lines). All edge-weights equal 1.
Suppose that we begin in the all-B state in both networks, that agents use log linear learning with 1   , and that the size of the advance is
. Let each network have n vertices. It can be shown that the waiting time to reach at least 99% A (and stay there with probability at least 99%) is unbounded in n for the network on the left, whereas it is bounded independently of n for the network on the right. In the latter case, simulations show that it takes less than 25 periods (on average) for A to penetrate to the 99% level independently of n. The key difference between the two situations is that, in the network with cliques, the innovation can establish a toehold in the cliques relatively quickly, which then causes the hub to switch to the innovation also.
Note, however, that fast learning in the network with cliques does not follow from Proposition 2, because not every node is contained in a clique. In particular, the hub is connected to all of the leaves, the number of which grows with the size of the tree, so it is not in an r-close-knit set of bounded size for any given r < 1/2.
Nevertheless learning is fast: any given clique adopts A with high probability in bounded time, hence a sizable proportion of the cliques linked to the hub switch to A in bounded time, and then the hub switches to A also. In other words, fast learning occurs through a combination of autonomy and contagion, a topic that we explore in the next section.
Autonomy and contagion
Contagion expresses the idea that once an innovation has become established for some core group, it spreads throughout the network via the best reply dynamic.
Morris [5] was the first to study the properties of contagion in the setting of local interaction games, and to formulate graph-theoretic conditions under which contagion causes the innovation to spread throughout the network (for more recent work along these lines see [6] [7] [8] ). While contagion by itself may not guarantee fast learning in a stochastic environment, a combination of autonomy and contagion does suffice. The idea is that autonomy allows the innovation to gain a foothold quickly on certain key subsets of the network, after which contagion completes the job.
Consider a subset S of nodes, all of which are playing A, and choose some  i S .
Let  be the size of the advance of A relative to B. Then A is a strict best response
Letting
 , we can write this as follows
Recall that for any vertex i and subset of vertices S, 
O S S i S d i S rd
Similarly, for each integer k > 1 recursively define the th k r-orbit by
Now suppose that
2) . Suppose also that everyone in the set S is playing A. If the learning process is deterministic best response dynamics, and if everyone updates once per time period, then after k periods everyone in the th k rorbit of S will be playing A. Of course, this does not show that log linear learning with asynchronous updating will produce the same result. The key difficulty is that the core set S of A-players might unravel before contagion converts the other players to A. However, this problem can be avoided if: i) the core set S reaches the all-A state within a bounded period of time; ii) S is autonomous and hence its members continue to play A with high probability.
These conditions are satisfied if the core set is the union of autonomous sets of bounded size. We therefore have the following result. We illustrate with a simple example. Let the network consist of a circle of n agents (the rim) plus a central agent (the hub). Each agent on the rim is adjacent to the hub and to its two immediate neighbors on the rim. Note that the hub is not contained in an r-close-knit set of bounded size for any r < ½ . However, for every r < ½ , the hub is in the first r-orbit of the rim. Moreover, for every r < 1/3, there is an r-close-knit set of bounded size that consists of rim nodes; namely, choose any sequence of k adjacent rim nodes where  k r 1 / (1 -3 ) . It follows from Proposition 3 that learning is fast for this family of graphs whenever   1 . it takes about 1/ .018 54  periods for any given agent to adopt A when none of his neighbors has adopted, yet it takes only about half as much time for nearly everyone to adopt. The reason, of course, is that the process is speeded up by contagion. The rate at which the innovation spreads results from a combination of autonomy and contagion.
Bursts of innovation
We have seen that the speed with which innovations spread in a social network depends crucially on the interaction between three features: the size of the advance , the degree of rationality , and the existence of autonomous groups that allow the innovation to gain a secure foothold. The greater the advance from the innovation relative to the status quo, the more rapidly it spreads for any given topology, and the more that people are clustered in small autonomous groups the more rapidly the innovation spreads for any given size of advance.
Furthermore the degree of rationality must be at an intermediate level for the rate of spread to be reasonably fast: if  is too high it will take a very long time before anyone even tries out the innovation, whereas if  is too low there will be so much random behavior that even approximate convergence will not take place.
In this section we examine the interaction between the network topology and the size of advance in more detail, and show that it leads to an important qualitative prediction about the spread of social innovations: namely, they tend to occur in large bursts rather than through small incremental improvements. The reason is that a small improvement takes a much longer time to gain an initial foothold than does an innovation that results in a major gain.
To illustrate this point concretely, fix a network  and assume for simplicity that all edge-weights equal 1. Consider an individual i with i d neighbors. The probability that i tries A, given that none of his neighbors is currently using A, 
This follows from the assumption that each agent updates according to a Poisson process with expectation one: the probability is (1 -1/e) that i does not update in period t + 1 and that j does update. Note, however, that if 2 j d    , the probability is fairly high that j will adopt -indeed the probability is close to one when  is large.
Thus the probability that any given edge { , } i j becomes coordinated on A within two periods is 
The inverse function f(r) mapping r to  is shown in Figure 5 for a twodimensional lattice and log linear learning with  = 1. The figure shows that to achieve a 1% average growth rate per period requires innovative bursts of size at least 40%. A 3% growth rate requires innovative bursts of at least 80%, and so forth.
Fig 5.
The level of innovative advance  = f(r) required to achieve an average growth rate of r per period. Log linear learning with =1 on a 30 x 30 twodimensional lattice.
Of course, these numbers depend on the topological properties of the grid and on our assumption that agents update using a log linear model. Different network structures and different learning rules may yield different results.
Nevertheless, this example illustrates a general phenomenon that we conjecture holds across a range of situations. Institutional change that involves a series of small step-by-step advances may take a very long time to spread as compared to a change of comparable total magnitude that occurs all at once. The basic reason is that it takes much longer for a small advance to gain a secure foothold in an autonomous group: the group must be quite large and/or it must be quite interconnected to prevent a small advance from unraveling. Furthermore, under a small advance there are fewer pathways through that allow contagion to complete the diffusion process. The key point is that social innovations are technologies that facilitate -and require --coordination with others to be successful. It is this feature that makes social change so difficult, and that favors large advances when change does occur.
